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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
IN THE 3fATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF 
J _._t~l\fES W. LINFORD, 
Deceased. 
Case No. 4040 
RESPONDENTS' 
BRIEF 
COJ.llJ.llENTS ON "'STATEMENT OF FACTS" 
Appellant's "Staten1ent of Facts" is spotty and 
very incomplete and 1nisleading. Some points and 
argtunents, settled in the first appeal in this estate, 
In Re Linford's Estate, 207, P. 2nd 1033, (Ut.), are 
repeated 'vhile important and controlling facts are omit-
ted, and many improper and 1nisleading inferences are 
sought to be drawn. 
For exa1nple: (1), On page 2 it is stated that notice 
of her "Final Account and Petition for Su1nmary Dis-
tribution'' 'Yas duly mailed to respondents, ''that no 
objections 'vere n1ade or entered, and on Dec. 26, 1942, 
the court signed a decree of Summary Distribution ... 
Whereupon Mrs. Linford, assuming the business to be 
hers as she had been given all of the assets by Court 
Decree, proceeded to operate it, 'vorking long hours, 
until Oct. 15, 1945, 'vhen she sold the entire business 
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2 
including the real estate to vV1n. A. Jones for $6,000.00 .. ' 
But appellant fails to state, as the uncontradicted 
testimony of Jean H. Linford sho,vs, that he \vas in 
the arrned services at that ti1ne and \vas not discharged 
fron1 the Veterans Hospital until Nov. 2, 1945, and that 
he received no notice that she \vas asking to have all of 
the property distributed to herself, ( tr. 37); that after 
convalesing and after getting married, he made arrange-
rnents with her (administratrix) to live in his father's 
ho1ne, but that on Feb. 10, 1948, she sent Jean a letter 
Ex. "G ", asking him to move out, ( tr. 38) ; that Jean 
then wrote his letter, Ex. "H", stating that he figured 
that descendant's children \vere entitled to part of the 
estate; that "she \vas horrified at that suggestion", 
(tr. 41); that later she offered us each $500.00" (tr. 42) 
Appellant also fails to state that the other adult 
. 
heir, Phoebe L. Binghan1 and her husband, can1e up to 
see the administratrix, when she started probate pro-
ceedings (tr. 48), and that she told them it \vould \vork 
a hardship on her, requiring her to sell the business and 
thus depriving her of a living, if the heirs should then 
demand their share of the estate. That she would do 
the right thing, and they didn't need to worry about 
her doing the right thing ( tr. 49, 57). 
Appellant also fails to note that after she offered 
respondents $500 or $550 each, and because they didn't 
accept her offer right there, she "rrote them a letter, 
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Ex. ''I", stating that she had consulted her attorney, 
'vho said they \Vere not entitled to anything, and no'v 
they \vould take \Yhat she \vould give them and settle 
on her ter1ns, ( tr. 53), and that shortly after that the 
Petition for Citation \vas filed against her. 
(2), ~-\.ppellant further evades the real facts and 
n1akes 1nisleading inferences and conclusions on pages 
-± and 5. It is true that a hearing was had on April 
;), 1950, but it is not true that after that hearing, the 
court, about :n1ay 22, 1950, ordered the administratrix 
to file ne\v Inventory and Appraisement. The facts 
are that after the hearing of April 5th, the lower court 
announced: "I'll n1ake a finding that either as adlnin-
istratrix or as trustee, all of the property referred to 
in this proceeding, belonged to deceased and are assets 
of the estate ( tr. 149); the court also stated that the 
inventory \vas not sufficiently definite and that he want-
ed her to file an account. 
All this happened long before May 22, 1950. That 
\vas the date this Inatter came before the court on her 
n1otion for further time in which to file her account 
( tr. 157). The trial court granted her until J nne 5, 
1950, to file her account of all the 1noney she had col-
lected, and stated that on failure to do so, that judg-
ment would be entered against her ( tr. 158). 
(3) Appellant also neglects to state that in the fore 
part of June, 1950, she did file her ''Final Account and 
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Petition for Settlement Thereof'' in which she showed 
and acknowledged cash receipts of $7 ,855.50, belonging 
to the estate, as the court had previously found. 
( 4) Appellant like\vise neglects to state that in her. 
said final account she listed a nu1nber of improper items 
as expenses, which the court listed and struck out, in 
Par. 9 of the Findings of Fact, signed and filed Decem-
ber 22, 1950. 
If the court will read ( tr. 158-164), it \Vill see \vhat 
a difficult tilne petitioners and the lo\ver court had to 
. get her to file an account of the 1noney, cash, which she 
had collected, and also that she expected the court to 
allo,,~ her a salary of $200 per month for 3 years, 
$7200.00, \vhile she operated the business of the Linford 
Upholstering Co., \vithout filing any account of the 
earnings or operation of said business. 
This court \vill also observe from the unverified 
pencil account which she at last did file (which had no 
vouchers or receipts of any kind to support it) and 
\vhich we believe should have been stricken from the 
files. But when her counsel admitted a s1nall net earn-
ing for the 3 year period, \Ve decided to accept it, in the 
interest of a speedy settlement, as the court finds in 
Par. 7 of its Findings of Fact. 
It should also be noted that on November 2, 1950, 
the administratrix flied her Petition for Distribution 
of Estate, prayed that due notice be given and that ''all 
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of the property of the said decedent 1nay be distribu-
ted to the above nan1ed heirs, to-,vit: Beatrice FJ. Lin-
ford Sor~n~en~ Jean H. Linford, Phoebe 1-l. Binghan1 
and J an1e8 St~phen Linford as provided by law''. 
It should also be noted that the lQwer court did 
not ask for any further appraisenzent, just asked her 
to file an inventory (tr. 156). But that she never did 
file a inventory of the piano and household furniture, 
n~ petitioners n1oved that she be required to do, as noted 
by the court in paragraph ± page 3 of the Findings of 
Fact. 
~-!R(;[rjf£1~\'1~8 O~r _._-!PPELLANT'S POINTS 
Poiuti) 1-4. The first four points listed by appel-
ant on page 6, are points \vhich were raised, argued to, 
and settled by this court, in the first appeal, supra, and 
said n1a tters are no'v settled, and cannot again be re-
argued in this e~tate. 
Point :5. The court erred in including the Wm. Han-
sen contract as assets of said estate, - On page 12 
counsel argues that the legal title to the pre1nises had 
he en conveyed to Jean H. Linford and that he in turn 
had conveyed it to Beatrice E. Linford, and thereby he 
argues that she beca1ne the O\vner of the funds repre-
~ented by the contract, even though the contract was 
pa~·able to the decedent, and hence she shouldn't be 
required to account for the 1noney collected on the Wm. 
FJ an sen con tract to huy said pre1nises. Even if the 
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naked legal title had been conveved to her, that alone~ 
oJ ' 
we submit, would not be any reason why she should 
not account for the money collected by her on the con-
tract for the sale of the premises, which was payable 
to the decedent and was considered to belong to him. 
Such were the facts here, but appellant again avoids 
the real facts. 
Jean H. Linford testified that he had no interest 
111 that property, that the money \vas payable to his 
father (tr. 43). The administratrix admitted that at 
the time of probate, she did not even knovv that the real 
estate, represented by the Wm. Hansen contract, had 
been put in her na1ne, and the trial court remarked: 
'·I'll take that answer" ( tr. 143-4). She also expressly 
adn1itted that, at the time decedent died, the $550.00 
and all interest payable under the Wm. Hansen contract, 
w'as payable to decedent and that she had collected all 
of it. 
Q. Why didn't you list the Hansen contract when 
you knew it was payable to Linford~ A. I don't know· 
\vhy I didn't list it (tr. 110). In addition, it should 
be noted that the trial court answered her counsel 
on this point as follows: ''The son took the title to 
accomodate his father and then deeded it to Beatrice 
E. Linford, she held it as trustee for her husband'' 
( tr. 151). 
Point 6. The court erred in including the insurance 
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Inoney. ,,~ e spc~ no 1nerit to that argun1ent. The ad-
Inini~tra.trix ad1nitted she received $268.50 from petit·* 
joner~ to apply on funeral expenses. In her final 
account, she takes and is allo,ved credit for the full 
an1onnt of the funeral expenses, $387.35. Counsel gives 
no reason 'vhY she should not account for the $268.50. 
It certainly "Tas not a gift to her. She got that 1noney 
fron1 petitioners under the representation to them that 
here ''Tas not enough money in the estate to bury their 
father. 
Point 7. The court erred in including the $6000.00 
received fron1 Wm. A Jones. On page 16 appellant.'s 
counsel says: ''This money did not exist when decedent 
died and 'vas therefore not part of the estate''. If 
that argun1ent is sound, then no ad1ninistrator 'vould 
be liable for any sale of conversion of estate's property 
to his own use. For when the heirs complained, the 
administrator could simply answer: ''The money I re-
ceived for your father's property did not exist when 
your father died, and therefore it is no part of his 
estate". 
Counsel repeats that the $6000.00, received frorr1 
\~Vn1. A. Jones for sale of Linford Upholstery Co .. bus-
iness including the real estate, "'vas a result of 3 years 
of hard vvork on the part of Beatrice E. Linford''. There 
is no evidence in the record to support that statement. 
We have already pointed out that the administratrix 
begged the heirs, at the time she started probate, not 
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then to deinand their share of the estate, as that would 
eon1pel her to sell the business and would thus deprive 
her of a living. ( tr. 48, 49, 57). Neither did the admin-
istratrix, in her testimony make such a claim. She test-
ified there was a growth in the business between the 
time r~inford died and when she sold the business 3 
years later ( tr. 146). She explained that this was due 
largely to conditions brought on by the war, when people 
could not buy new furniture, but had to have their 
old furniture repaired. She also testified : ' 'At the time 
of his death there "\vas work to be done in the shop. 
He had gone out the night before he died and brought 
in several pieces of furniture to be repaired, and I went 
in there and helped 1\ir. · Passy repair that furniture 
and clean it up for customers' and I stayed and ran the 
business ... In the 3 years that passed I 1nade a great 
gro,vth in the business ( tr. 169). I didn't ask permis-
sion to operate the business ( tr. 116). 
Regarding the question of fraud, the lo,ver court 
observed: "'l,here never has been a petition filed for 
leave to operate this business ... and never any account 
filed ... I hesitate to make an express finding of direct 
fraud, but to that extent, yes ( tr. 151). I find she 
failed and neglected to ask leave of the court to oper-
ate a going business, and failed and neglected to account 
to this court of her doings in the operation of that bus-
Iness. To that extent indirectly, the court makes a 
finding of fraud, and that she took all of the proceeds 
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and pocketed then1 out of the business" ( tr. 152) 
Counsel con1plains that the court didn't allow her 
a salary during the three years she operated the bus-
iness. The trial court asked counsel to subn1it or pro-
duce authority sho,ving that the court "yas justified 
in allowing her a salary \\There she had operated the 
business of decedent 'vithout authority of court. Coun-
sel failed to produce a single case so holding, and cite~ 
none in appellant's brief. We think the la\v is clearly 
against such a contention. 
In 33 C.J .S. page 1171, Sec. 193, the head note 
reads: '• .... <\n executor or administrator may not engage 
in business with funds of the estate, and if he does so 
he is chargeable 'vith all losses incurred and profits 
n1ade. '' In the text on the next page the rule is stated 
thus: 
''So great a breach of trust is it for the repre-
sentative to engage in business with the funds' 
of the estate that the law charges him with all 
the losses thereby incurred without on the other 
hand allowing him to receive the· benefit of any 
profits which he may have made, the rule be-
ing that the persons beneficially interested in 
the estate may either hold the representative 
liable for the amount so used with interest, or 
at their election may take all of the profits which 
the representative has made by such unauthoriz-
ed use of funds of the estate ... Since the repre-
sentative cannot deal with the property to his own 
advantage, he is not entitled to a salary for his 
own services to be deducted from the gross re-
ceipts. 
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In case at bar the adn1inistratrix not only fails to 
render any accounting of her living expenses taken out 
of that business during those 3 years, but she wants 
the court to allo\v her a salary out of estate funds, with-
. out even rendering a proper account showing the net 
earnings of the business during that three year period . 
. A.t the bottom of page 17 and on 18 appellant again 
argues that the grandchild, James Stephen Linford 
\Yas not a proper party to the petition for citation filed 
against her by respondents. That point was settled 
by this court in the first appeal in this case, supra, 
\vhere this court said: 
''There is no merit to the ~rgument made by 
counsel that there is a defect and misjoinder of 
parties to petition for citation because James S. 
Linford, the aforementioned minor heir of de-
ceased, was not made a party to the petition. It is 
not necessary that he should have been joined as 
a party. This is not an action against the admin-
istratrix, but rather a petition directing the 
court's attention to certain alleged improper 
fraudulent acts on the part of the administratrix, 
and requesting that the court require her to prop-
erly administer the estate . . . '' 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS APPEAL 
We think respondents Motion to Dismiss Appeal 
should be granted for two reasons: (1) Appellant did 
not make the grandchild James S. Linford a party to 
this appeal and no notice of appeal has been served 
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on hi1n or his guardian. if he has a guardian. This 
i~ an appeal fron1 a judg1nent and decree of distribu-
tion of estate, "~here the court granted and distributed 
$1195.~)4 to each of the three heirs. The appellant 
~eeks to reYerse and v-acate the said decree, hence this 
appeal is just as n1uch an action against J a1nes S. Lin-
ford, as it is against Jean I-I. Linford or Phoebe L. 
Bingha1n, for if appellant succeeds, the fruits and bene-
fit of that dec.ree 'vill be 'viped out and set aside as to 
all the heirs. Hence this appeal is really an action 
against all of the heirs, for it seeks to take away the 
benefit which the lower court avvarded to each of them. 
Hence 've submit that James S. Lindford is a neces-
sary party to this appeal, and that 'vithout making him 
a party and vvithout any notice to him or his guardian, 
this court is without jurisdiction to vacate and set aside 
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and/ or the judg-
Inent and decree of distribution, so far as the minor is 
concerned. 
In 34 C. J. S. pg. 926, Sec. 1814, it is stated that 
proceedings for review of actions, by or against executor 
or administrator, are governed by rules that govern 
proceedings for review of civil actions. In 4 C. J. S. 
pg. 854, Sec. 391, the rule is stated thus: 
Generally all parties to the judgment or de-
cree below whose interest will be directly affect-
ed, if the judgment or decree.is sustained, revers-
ed, or modified on appeal or writ of error must 
be made parties. 
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In addition, it should be kept in mind that the lower 
court specifically ordered that the 1ninor child or his 
guardian should be given a copy of the. accounting and 
notice of every proceeding by the administratrix ( tr. 
156).. ln the Order and Judgment signed and filed 
April 24, 1950, the lower court wrote the following: ''It 
iH further ordered that James 8. Lindford be given 
notieP of all proceedings or actions of said adn1inistra-
trix' '. rrhis order has also been ignored by appellant 
and her councel. 
(2), Our second reason why we think Motion to 
Dis1niss Appeal should be granted is, that this appeal 
'vas not taken in time. All the items complained of by 
appellant \vere adjudged and settled by the court at 
the conclusion of the hearing· of April 4-5 (tr. 149), 
'vhen the trial court announced: '.'I'll make a finding 
that either as administratrix or as trustee, all of the 
property represented in this proceeding belonged to 
the desceased and 'vere assets of the estate· ... Every-
thing listed in the petition, because they were purchased 
fron1 funds derived fro1n the business, or assets of the 
estate at the tiine of his death". 
The trial court even suggested that she might want 
to take an appeal from the ruling: ''it may be gentlemen 
that under these new rules you 1nay want to take an 
interlocutory appeal before going ahead with this thing". 
(Tr. 149) On April 24, 1950, Findings of Fact, Conclus-
ions of I-.JR\V, Order and ,J udg1nent 'vas signed and filed. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
These findings cover and settle the n1atters herein coln-
plained of by the appellant. The only reason the court 
didn •t then settle the amount to be distributed to each 
heir, 'vas that the court asked her to file her account-
ing of her rash reciepts as found by the court, and also, 
the court "ranted her to file an accounting covering the 
three year period that she operated the business. 
The Findings of Fact and Decree signed Dec. 22, 
1950, is based on the findings of fact, conclusions of 
la-\v and order signed and filed April 24, 1950, plus the 
~1nall net earnings which she ad1ni tted over the 3 year 
period, $1089.8±, as the court stated in Par. 7 of the 
Findings of Fact. She isn't complaining about the 
court adding the $1089.84. The matters of which she 
con1plains \Yere settled and adjudged April 24, 1950, 
and no appeal has been taken from those findings and 
judgment then made by the court. 
Hence we submit that the motion to dismiss the 
appeal should also be made on this second ground, that 
the appeal was not taken in time. 
SUl\1~IARY OF POINTS 
To Summarize: Respondents submit that this ap-
peal is wholly without merit and should be dismissed, 
because: 
. 1. The administratrix stands convicted of gross 
neglect of duty, which practically amounts to fraud. 
rrhu~ : (a), She admits collecting all of the six $100 
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.... ~riel Larsen mortgage notes payable to decedent, plus 
$132 interest, total $732, but accounted for only $500; 
(b) She ad1nits collecting the Wm. Hansen contract, 
~~~G50, payable to the decedent, plus $105 interest, total 
$65G, hut accounted for none of it. She likewise admits 
receiving $268.50 from the heirs, to apply on funeral 
expen~ses and like,vise failed to account for that: (c) 
She admits that she operated the Linford Upholstering 
Co. business without court authority and then sold it 
for $6,000.00 cash, but failed to account for the $6,000.00 
or any of the earnings of that business. 
2. Counsel for appellant has presented no valid 
reason \vhy the decree from which she appeals should 
not be sustained. It is based on her own verified Final 
Account and Petition for Settlement Thereof, filed in 
June 1950, showing admitted cash receipts of $7855.50 
belonging to the estate, and her pencil unverified ac-
count, filed about Nov. 2, by which her counsel admitted 
a net earning of $1089.84, 'for the 3 year period, and her 
Petition for Distribution of Estate, also filed Nov. 2, 
1950. 
3. In her said petition for distribution she alleges: 
(1) That the entire estate has no'v ben reduced to cash 
and that there is not now any property other than cash, 
in the hands of the administratrix; (2) That the heirs 
are entitled to have the entire estate distributed to them 
as provided by law. Wherefore, she prayed that the 
property be so distributed, \vhich is just what the court 
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did. "~hen it distributed 1/3rd, $l7~l~1.91, to her, and the 
balance, $3587.82 to the three heirs, $1195.94 to each. 
So the distribution 1nade by the court is based on her 
0\\711 accounts filed in court, and on her petition for dis-
tribution of the estate, n1oney in her hands, to the heirs, 
n~ the la":r provides. 
-±. In settling her accounts the lovver court, as vvell 
as the heirs, \Yere very liberal to the administratrix; 
(1) The court allo,ved all the deductions she set up and 
clain1ed (although the same \Vere not supported by any 
receipts or vouchers showing she had paid out that 
1noney), except the court struck the four ite1ns men-
tioned by the court in its finding No. 9, which \vere 
elearly illegal and not deductable as claims against the 
estate; (2) We accepted her counsel's statement that 
the net earnings for the three year period were only 
$1089.84 (when in fact they were $1622.32 even by her 
O\vn questionable account.), thus granting her further 
advantage of $532.48; (3) In addition to that the 
court allowed her extra compensation, $640.00, which 
she was not entitled to under the Statute, Sec. 
102-11-25 (U.C.A.), for she had not performed any 
''extraordinary services'' as the basis for her extra 
co1npensation, as provided. by that statute. She first 
reported the estate as amounting to only $1072.40, and 
she had all of the estate distributed to herself two 
1nonths after the death of decedent. 
5. Lastly, we submit this court has no jurisdiction 
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and respondents' Motion to Dismiss Appeal should be 
granted, for the two reasons above stated, to-wit: ( 1) 
,J au1es S. ljinford is a beneficiary in said decree and is 
therefore a necessary party to this appeal proceeding, 
~eeking to Yaeate and set aside sairl decree; neither the 
1uinor nor his guardian have been made a party to this 
proceeding, nor has any notice of appeal been served 
on either of them. 
(2) The items complained of in this appeal, to-,vit: 
(a) That the court charged her 'vith collection of the 
'\:rn. Hansen contract, $655.00; (b) That the court 
charged her \vith collections under the Arial Larsen 
notes, $232.00; (c) That the court charged her 'vith 
the $268.50 received fro1n the heirs to apply on funeral 
expenses ; and (d) The court charged her 'vith the 
$6,000.00, she received fro1n the sale of the business 
jncluding the real estate, \vere all 1natters \vhich 'vere 
found and decided by the trial court in its finding of 
fact, conclusions of la'v and judgn1ent, signed and filed 
..:\pril24, 1950, and fron1 which no appeal was ever taken. 
That said n1atters have therefore become final, res ad-
judicata, and cannot no'v be brought before this court, 
on appeal for reconsideration. 
Respectfully subn~itted, 
LEON FONNESBECK 
Attorney for Respondents. 
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